Well-Founded Fear

19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987) · 1987

Adopted the 10% standard for objective well-founded fear: an applicant need not show a likelihood of persecution exceeding 50%; a 10% chance of persecution if returned may suffice.

Consistent with INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca (1987).

480 U.S. 421 (1987) · 1987

The 'well-founded fear' standard for asylum is more generous than the 'clear probability' standard for withholding; an applicant need not show persecution is more likely than not—a genuine possibility suffices.

Supreme Court decision that established the lower burden of proof for asylum compared to withholding of removal. Adopted by the BIA in Matter of Mogharrabi.

410 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2005) · 2005

A finding of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution; the government bears the burden of rebutting this presumption through evidence of changed country conditions or internal relocation.

598 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2010) · 2010

Bhutanese Hindus subjected to ethnic and religious discrimination amounting to persecution had a well-founded fear; even non-severe acts can cumulatively constitute persecution.

29 I&N Dec. 347 (BIA 2025) · 2025

Respondent did not establish a well-founded fear based on a pretextual summons for political activity where a similar summons did not result in harm to his son and the respondent lived for years in Moldova without harm following the summons.

Illustrates that country conditions evidence combined with the applicant's own uneventful prior experience can undercut the objective component of well-founded fear.

29 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 2026) · 2026

Death threats alone rarely rise to the level of persecution and only do so if they are objectively credible and issued by a person or persons with the immediate ability to carry them out.

The standard for death threats as persecution is high: both objective credibility and immediacy of ability to act are required. Generalized or unspecific threats generally fall short.

29 I&N Dec. 499 (BIA 2026) · 2026

(1) Past persecution creates a presumption of future threat to life or freedom on the basis of the original claim, which may be rebutted by a fundamental change in circumstances. (2) An IJ cannot rely on generalized crime and widespread violence unrelated to the original claim to find the presumption rebutted, particularly where other evidence suggests a fundamental change such that the respondent will no longer be harmed on a protected ground.

Rebuttal of the past-persecution presumption must be targeted: generalized crime or violence in the home country is not sufficient — the government must show the specific threat on the protected ground has dissipated.

29 I&N Dec. 642 (BIA 2026) · 2026

(1) A 3-day detention during which respondent was beaten once but did not sustain significant injury does not rise to the level of persecution. (2) A government's general deference to tribal mechanisms for resolving tribal conflict does not indicate the government is unable or unwilling to control persecutors within a tribe.

Harm severity threshold: a brief detention with a single, non-serious beating may not amount to persecution. Government tolerance of customary or tribal dispute resolution is not tantamount to complicity in persecution.